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IS REGIME CHANGE ENOUGH 
FOR BURMA?
 
The Problem of State Capacity
 
Neil A. Englehart
Abstract
 
The U.S. and the EU employ sanctions to encourage regime change in Burma.
This policy ignores serious problems of state capacity that impede a transition
to democracy and would plague any transitional regime. Engagement with the
current regime on issues of state capacity would improve the chances for a
transition.
 
Since 1990, when the military government of Burma/
Myanmar
 
1
 
 refused to recognize the results of national elections, international
attention has centered on the relationship between the junta and the opposi-
tion, led by Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD).
Focusing on the military government’s highly charged and clear-cut repudia-
tion of democracy, however, diverts attention from more fundamental prob-
lems in the country—problems that must be addressed before a transitional
government would be viable.
The United States government has adopted a hard-line policy of sanctions
and diplomatic isolation, prioritizing the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from
house arrest and a transition to democratic rule under the NLD as its core
 
1. Although the government has changed the official name of the country from Burma to
Myanmar, much of the discussion in this article refers to the period when it was known as Burma.
To avoid confusion, I employ the name Burma consistently here.
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policy goals.
 
2
 
 This policy is simultaneously too difficult and too easy. It is too
difficult because the policy requires a complete transformation of the regime
before sanctions can be lifted. Even significant partial steps, such as increased
cooperation on drug issues and the release from house arrest of Aung San Suu
Kyi for a time in 2002–03, have not met with a positive response from the U.S.
Yet, the policy is also too easy, because it suggests that political and human
rights reforms are all that is necessary for Burma. It ignores the deeper struc-
tural conditions that led to the origins of military rule in the collapse of de-
mocracy 50 years ago. The first democratic regime in Burma failed because of
the weakness of the state apparatus. Advocates of democracy in Burma today
need to look seriously at this failure and consider what changes would be
necessary to make a democracy viable there today.
The repressive nature of Burma’s government seems to suggest that it is a
strong state. While the military government has been able to coerce citizens,
spy on opposition groups, and repress dissent, the state apparatus is actually
failing in many respects. The civil service has been crippled by repeated
purges, politicization, absurdly low wages, and unchecked corruption. These
problems are so severe that the bureaucracy has difficulty accomplishing even
basic tasks necessary to maintain the regime, such as collecting revenue and
supplying the army. The government has virtually ceased to provide services
such as education and health care.
In the event of a transition, the new government would require extensive
cooperation from the military. Without this it would be unable to govern, lead-
ing to the intense localization of politics dominated by local bosses, insurgent
groups, military officers, and criminal organizations. A similar dynamic un-
dermined the first, and so far only, democratic regime in Burma, which lasted
from 1948 to 1962, with a brief interruption in 1958–60. The failure of this
democratic regime paved the way for military intervention in politics from
1958 to 1960, and then continuously from 1962 to the present. The democracy
movement that began in the late 1980s was not inspired by the glories of the
1950s; rather, it was motivated by the dismal economic failures of the military
regime that has ruled since 1962.
There is growing recognition that the military must be part of any future
transitional process in Burma. The strategy of international sanctions and dip-
lomatic isolation has neither encouraged the military to participate in a transi-
tion nor laid the foundations for a new environment where cooperation with a
new government might appear attractive. Furthermore, sanctions and diplomatic
pressure undermine the possibility of rehabilitating institutions necessary for
 
2. See U.S. Congress, Public Law 108-61 (July 28, 2003), paragraph 3 (a) (3) (B) 
 
,
 
http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname
 
5
 
108_cong_public_laws&docid
 
5
 
f:publ061.
108.pdf
 
.
 
.
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democratic government to succeed, including an independent judiciary and
competent civil service.
 
Democracy in Burma: Failure to Failure
 
At independence in 1948, the Burmese inherited a democratic constitution and
a weak state from the British. The British colonial regime had been deeply un-
popular and coercive, more resembling a military occupation than a Weberian
state.
 
3
 
 The native Burmese officials it employed were widely mistrusted and
notoriously corrupt.
 
4
 
 During the Japanese occupation (1942–45), the already
weak administration collapsed entirely. Private individuals, particularly those
with armed followers or connections to local Burma Independence Army (BIA)
units assumed authority in many areas.
 
5
 
 The Japanese never succeeded in im-
posing an effective administration of their own and in fact worked to under-
mine the nascent administrative committees established by the BIA for fear
they would become a threat to Japanese supremacy.
 
6
 
The resistance movement against the Japanese further eroded the state’s
control of violence. Competing nationalist organizations had formed militias
even before the war. While their members did not carry firearms, most in-
cluded some sort of military training and drills. These “pocket armies,” though
not large, were a regular feature of political life in prewar Burma, providing
“protection” at political, nationalist, and religious events. Similar groups were
part of the nationalist movement elsewhere in British India.
 
7
 
 In Burma, how-
ever, the militias followed a different trajectory. The Japanese invasion trans-
 
3. Michael Aung-Thwin, “The British ‘Pacification’ of Burma: Order without Meaning,” 
 
Jour-
nal of Southeast Asian Studies
 
 16 (September 1985), pp. 245–61; Mary P. Callahan, 
 
Making Ene-
mies: War and State Building in Burma
 
 (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), chap. 1. As
a part of British India, Burma was governed by the Indian Civil Service (ICS). At the higher levels,
the ICS was staffed almost exclusively by Europeans and met the classic Weberian definition of a
legal-rational bureaucracy: it was meritocratic in its recruitment and advancement, employees
lived on their salaries, and business was conducted according to regular written rules and proce-
dures. However, employees at the lower levels of the system, including assistants, clerks, messen-
gers, and so on, were often poorly selected and corrupt.
4. James F. Guyot, “Bureaucratic Transformation in Burma,” in Ralph Braibanti, ed., 
 
Asian
Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition
 
 (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 1966), p. 366. For a first-hand account by a native colonial official (in Burmese), see
“Ludu” U Hla, 
 
Kyunnaw Burokarat 
 
[I am a bureaucrat] (Mandalay: Gyibwayepain Press, 1970).
5. The BIA nominally aligned with the Japanese. Its core was the “Thirty Comrades,” who
traveled to Japan before the war to seek military training and aid in the struggle for independence
from the British. They returned to Burma with the Japanese army but later turned against the Jap-
anese. The Thirty Comrades included Aung San, the great hero of the independence movement,
and Ne Win, who ruled Burma as a dictator from 1958–60 and 1962–88.
6. Callahan, 
 
Making Enemies
 
, chap. 2.
7. Thomas Blom Hansen, 
 
The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern
India
 
 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 92.
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formed them into Japanese militia units or Allied resistance cells. Many were
linked to criminal organizations and involved in smuggling and black market
activities.
After the war, the Indian Civil Service in Burma never recovered even its
pre-war level of functionality. Only 70% of indigenous officials and 60% of
Europeans returned to duty in 1945, and a high rate of resignations after that
year meant that the system continued to degenerate. Those who did return
found much of the infrastructure of British rule destroyed, including records,
prisons, offices, railroads, telegraphs, and other installations.
 
8
 
 When indepen-
dence came, the central government had relatively little control over the coun-
tryside and only a limited capacity to govern. The rapid handover of authority
to Burmese nationalists in 1947–48 ensured that the British had little time or
incentive to build strong institutions.
The Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) under Aung San en-
joyed tremendous legitimacy as a consequence of the anti-colonial struggle,
much as the NLD might if it came to power today. Such legitimacy does not
guarantee institutional capacity, however. The AFPFL’s popularity enabled it
to dominate post-independence elections. However, the democratically elected
government was handicapped by the dysfunctional state inherited from the
British. Like the Japanese occupation regime and the post-war British colonial
administration, the independent democratic government suffered from both
weak administrative capabilities and lack of control over the use of violence
by criminals, local political bosses, and others; it was never able to overcome
these handicaps. To get a firmer grasp of the challenges that would face any
future democratic regime, it is worthwhile to examine in detail the problems
that brought down this first democratic government in Burma.
 
Lack of Administrative Capacity
 
The civil service of newly independent Burma suffered from serious personnel
shortages, which led to the hasty and often politicized recruitment of poorly
trained personnel. The civil service expanded, but its quality declined. Precise
quantitative measures of this decline are lacking, because the civil service did
a poor job of collecting and reporting statistical information. One indicator,
however, is the changing structure of state revenues. Land taxes, which had
been the mainstay of British colonial revenues but are relatively difficult to
collect, fell sharply. Non-tax revenues such as Japanese war reparations and
fees for services became the largest category of income. Customs duties, which
are relatively easy to collect, became the second largest category of revenue.
 
9
 
8. Guyot, “Bureaucratic Transformation,” p. 388.
9. Robert H. Taylor, 
 
The State in Burma
 
 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1987), p. 255.
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Territorial administration similarly declined under parliamentary rule. The
Democratic Local Government Act of 1949 mandated the popular election of
local government with executive powers, subject to the approval of higher-
level councils. Local bosses and politicos nominally aligned with the AFPFL
dominated these councils. Since these bosses often controlled local police
forces and pocket armies, they could intimidate the opposition and capture
ballot boxes. They used the councils to harass or eliminate local rivals, build
armed followings, facilitate legal or illegal businesses, control land distribution,
and manage tenants. Local bosses often received concurrent administrative
appointments in return for cooperating with the AFPFL government, further
strengthening their power.
 
10
 
 As a result, according to John Cady, “[T]he cen-
tral authorities were frequently powerless to interfere in district affairs, which
were actually being run semi-independently by party henchmen.”
 
11
 
Lack of Control of Violence
 
After the war, banditry and organized crime fostered by chaotic wartime con-
ditions persisted, in part because local political bosses and criminal gangs con-
trolled private armed forces that the central government could not disarm. The
abundance of small armed groups hampered efforts to centralize the control of
violence. These descendants of prewar pocket armies and wartime resistance
cells were retained in the hands of local bosses and were not accountable to the
central government. Their very origins lay in their exclusion from the state:
 
In the postwar era, when political parties tried to organize and build support
throughout the country, the postwar generation of [pocket armies], like other social
actors, became logical constituents for the parties, and soon necessary aspects of
their apparatus. In this manner [pocket armies] became an indispensable part of what
it meant in post-colonial Burma to accumulate and consolidate power.
 
12
 
The pocket armies of the 1950s were better armed than their prewar prede-
cessors. After the war, caches of Japanese and Allied arms were scattered
across the country. Mary Callahan estimates that there were between 30,000
and 50,000 weapons hidden during this period.
 
13
 
 By the standards of today’s
collapsed states such as Somalia or Afghanistan, this is not a large number,
but given the general disorganization of the armed forces and police, it was
sufficient to pose a real threat to public order.
 
10. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “The Politics of State-Business Relations in Post-Colonial Burma,”
Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University (2001), p. 71.
11. John F. Cady, 
 
A History of Modern Burma 
 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958),
p. 602.
12. Mary P. Callahan, “The Origins of Military Rule in Burma,” Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell
University (1996), p. 129.
13. Callahan, 
 
Making Enemies
 
, p. 107.
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Aung San attempted to absorb the pocket armies and organize them for AFPFL
purposes by folding them into a national paramilitary organization called the
People’s Volunteer Organization (PVO).
 
14
 
 However, this attempt was only partly
successful and the later split of the PVO into pro- and anti-government factions
negated its usefulness. Pocket armies were finally disarmed only after the 1962
coup.
 
15
 
The weakness of central authority and the proliferation of armed groups en-
couraged a series of insurrections that nearly overwhelmed the government.
Communist insurgents and Muslim guerrillas were already in the field prior to
independence, alongside substantial gangs of bandits. In 1948 and 1949, the
mainstream faction of the Communist Party of Burma and mutinous ethnic
regiments from the army launched their own insurgencies.
 
16
 
Far from causing AFPFL local bosses and the state apparatus to rally together,
the insurgencies further undermined state capacity. In desperation, the govern-
ment struck alliances with local leaders to turn some pocket armies into mili-
tias called 
 
sitwundan 
 
(special police reserves).
 
17
 
 These 
 
sitwundan
 
 were valuable
to the government at a time when the army was crippled by defections and
hamstrung by insurgent operations that came within a few miles of Rangoon.
The 
 
sitwundan
 
 were effective against the insurgents, who seldom had superior
weapons or training. However, the program formalized the power of local
elites to command what were essentially private military forces. These forces
continued to be used to intimidate both the opposition and voters, capture bal-
lot boxes, and ensure the dominance of local bosses aligned with the AFPFL.
Militia leaders often grew politically important in their own right. In many
areas, the militia leaders were reputed to be more powerful than state-appointed
civilian administrators or even military commanders: they effectively eclipsed
the state.
 
18
 
 Empowering local bosses strengthened the capacity of the central gov-
ernment to resist the insurrection but did so at the cost of eroding the state’s ca-
pacity to manage violence in the territories it ostensibly controlled. Formalizing
 
14. Hugh Tinker, in 
 
The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence 
 
(New
York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 17, characterizes the PVO as “in fact a private army”
under Aung San’s direction.
15. Callahan, “The Origins of Military Rule,” pp. 303–08.
16. The descendants of some of these insurgencies remain in the field today, although the once
formidable Communist Party of Burma collapsed in 1989. On the complex history of the insurgen-
cies, see Martin Smith, 
 
Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity
 
 (New York: Zed Books,
1999); and Bertil Lintner, 
 
Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948
 
 (Chiang Mai: Silk-
worm Books, 1999).
17. Andrew Selth, 
 
Burma’s Armed Forces: Power without Glory 
 
(Norwalk, Conn.: Eastbridge
Books, 2002), p. 156, claims that the 
 
sitwundan
 
 were incorporated into regular army units in 1953,
but some were folded into a later program named 
 
pyusawhti
 
, after an ancient Burmese hero. Inde-
pendent units flourished until 1962.
18. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “The Politics of State-Business Relations,” p. 73.
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the local bosses’ control over armed followers helped reconcile the bosses to
the government; many were elected to parliament on the AFPFL ticket in the
1951 election. Their accommodation to the central government, however, was
predicated on retaining their local authority unchallenged by the state apparatus.
The stability of the ostensibly democratic central government, in other words,
depended on its confirming the arbitrary power of local bosses.
 
State Failure and Democratic Failure
 
The situation in democratic Burma resembled that in the weak states described
by Joel Migdal, in which “the ineffectiveness of state leaders who have faced
impenetrable barriers to state predominance has stemmed from the nature of
the societies they have confronted—from the resistance posed by chiefs, land-
lords, bosses, rich peasants, clan leaders . . . through their various social orga-
nizations.”
 
19
 
 Migdal’s formulation of weak state/strong society, however, has
the unfortunate consequence of implying that societies are somehow naturally
strong or weak relative to the state. It is the political decisions made by both
state elites and the leaders of social groups that determine the relative strength
of each. In Burma, AFPFL leaders decided to tolerate a relatively strong soci-
ety. The military governments that succeeded it have strengthened the state’s
control over violence and used that to dramatically weaken independent social
organizations, but officials have not tried to strengthen other aspects of the
state. This has helped perpetuate their power in the short term, at the cost of
limiting the state’s ability to interact with society and extract resources. The
result has been to weaken society without strengthening the civilian part of
the state apparatus.
Any government needs a functional state apparatus to rule. Making and en-
acting policy requires resources, which must be extracted by the state appara-
tus in the form of taxes and fees. A political system that cannot tax effectively
will not be able to do anything else effectively. In addition, any government
requires a civil service and military willing and able to enact policy on the
ground. Democratic governments have additional special needs: an indepen-
dent and competent legal system, a professional military under civilian con-
trol, and a reasonably honest and professional police force. Authoritarian
governments may be able to do without such amenities and in many cases are
better off without them. In fact, authoritarian rulers often attack the state appa-
ratus to reduce its capacity to oppose them and to prevent citizens from exer-
cising legal constraints on the regime. Democratic regimes, on the other hand,
need a strong state apparatus to protect citizens and provide legal leverage
against ruling elites.
 
19. Joel S. Migdal, 
 
Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capa-
bilities in the Third World
 
 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 33.
This content downloaded from 129.1.59.69 on Thu, 30 Apr 2015 11:52:13 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 NEIL A. ENGLEHART
 
629
In countries lacking the advantage of an effective state apparatus, pri-
vate networks of power—such as the local bosses of Burma in the 1950s—
overshadow or undermine the state. Migdal describes how landlords, political
bosses, and other local elites resist state authority and perpetuate private net-
works of power in weak states. These local elites can pose significant obstacles
to democratic governance. They may block the policies of elected govern-
ments, undermining the efficacy of democratic rule. They may be able to cor-
rupt or coerce lower-echelon representatives of the state apparatus whose job
it is to implement policy on the ground. They may also attack democracy di-
rectly, using force to intimidate political opponents and manipulate elections.
 
20
 
In addition to interfering with the normal, legally prescribed procedures of
the bureaucracy, local elites may also undermine the state’s control of the use
of violence. Local bosses often command considerable means of violence that
are not under central control, in the form of gangs of thugs, paramilitaries, mi-
litias, or corrupt police forces. In these cases, it is easy for them to manipulate
elections by intimidating voters and opposition groups and by capturing ballot
boxes. They can thereby undermine democracy very directly. They generally
do not challenge the institutions of democracy but rather, shape them for their
own ends. For instance, such local bosses often elect themselves, their kin, or
close relatives to national office in order to better oversee their interests from
the capital. This was common in 1950s Burma.
Guillermo O’Donnell has pointed out the special vulnerability of democratic
regimes to weak states. He emphasizes the frustration of legal equality that he
identifies with democratic citizenship as being the core problem in areas con-
trolled by local bosses rather than the central government:
 
Consider those regions where the local powers (both those formally public as well
as 
 
de facto
 
) establish power circuits that operate according to rules which are incon-
sistent, if not antagonistic, with the law that supposedly regulates the national terri-
tory. These are systems of private power (or better, privatized power, since some of
the main actors hold state positions), where some rights and guarantees of demo-
cratic legality have close to nil effectiveness. This extends to numerous private rela-
tionships which are usually decided, even by the judiciary of those regions, on the
basis of naked power asymmetries that exist among the parties. These neofeudalized
regions contain state organizations, national, provincial, and municipal. But the
obliteration of legality deprives the regional power circuits, including those state
agencies, of the 
 
public
 
, lawful dimension without which the national state and the
order it supports vanish.
 
21
 
20. Ibid., chap. 7.
21. Guillermo O’Donnell, “On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A
Latin American View with Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries,” 
 
World Development
 
21:8 (August 1993), p. 1359.
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Essential conditions for democratic governance may thus go unmet because
of the weakness of the state apparatus and its inability to control local elites.
Even where democratic institutions appear to be functioning, they may be de-
void of substance if the central government does not have effective control
over peripheral areas. Instead, local bosses neutralize or coopt the state agen-
cies legally charged with providing public goods, diverting them to serve pri-
vate interests. Such a situation undercuts support for democracy by crippling
the capacity of the government to formulate and execute policy.
The rule of local bosses in democratic Burma closely resembled that ob-
served by O’Donnell in Latin America. The result of local boss rule often was
increasing lawlessness, unlawful police actions, the use of torture, arbitrary
imprisonment and summary executions, limitations on free speech and assem-
bly, a flourishing black market, and declining educational and health services.
 
22
 
Local bosses undermined democracy directly by manipulating elections and in-
timidating the opposition. As a consequence, the coup of 1962 was not vigor-
ously resisted and some Burmese welcomed the end of the failing democratic
regime.
 
Military Rule
 
Unlike the civilian government and bureaucracy, the Burmese army under Ne
Win had reformed itself in the 1950s. The pocket armies of local bosses could
handle the relatively small, poorly armed, often undisciplined insurgent groups.
However, as the insurgencies waned after 1950, the army was faced with a
new threat that the pocket armies could not handle: the incursion of Chinese
Kuomintang (Nationalist Party, KMT) troops into the northern part of the
country. The KMT troops were retreating from Chinese Communist forces
and setting up camps in Burma from which to reorganize and launch fresh at-
tacks into China. They were supplied by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
After a series of operational failures against the KMT troops, Ne Win em-
barked on a program of capacity building that remade the army into Burma’s
most efficient and centralized institution.
 
23
 
As a consequence of this reform, the state in Burma developed severe inter-
nal tension. The civil service and territorial administration remained inef-
fective, dependent on local bosses with private armies at their disposal. The
military, on the other hand, became a much stronger institution. Over time, the
military had less need for alliances with local bosses and began to see pocket
 
22. Ibid., pp. 1358–59. A useful illustration of Burmese provincial politics in this period is the
memoir of District Officer Balwant Singh, 
 
Independence and Democracy in Burma, 1945–1952:
The Turbulent Years 
 
(Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Center for South and Southeast
Asian Studies, 1993).
23. See Callahan, 
 
Making Enemies
 
, chap. 6.
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armies as a dangerous annoyance. In any showdown with the institutionally
strengthened military, the civilian government was at a disadvantage. When in
1958 a split within the AFPFL threatened to provoke a coup from field officers,
the beleaguered civilian prime minister, U Nu, handed over power to a military
“caretaker government” under Ne Win.
The 1958–60 caretaker government initially appeared to be interested in
building state capacity. It disarmed the pocket armies, reduced corruption, and
improved bureaucratic efficiency. However, successive military governments
in Burma since the 1962 coup have failed to address the country’s on-going
governance problems. In many ways, these governments have made things
worse. The military’s greatest accomplishment was disarming local bosses
and private armies in the Burman heartland, thus consolidating the state’s con-
trol of violence. However these regimes have continued to cripple the civil ser-
vice, leading to a precipitous decline in the delivery of services and reducing
the central government’s access to what Michael Mann terms “infrastructural
power.” In contrast to the state’s arbitrary coercive power, which Mann refers
to as “despotic power,” infrastructural power refers to the state’s capacity to
penetrate society with the goal of coordinating and regulating social life. This
requires the cooperation of social groups, a process that gives states broader
authority over more areas of social life but circumscribes the exercise of such
authority with increasingly rule-bound bureaucratic and legal procedures. Thus,
Mann says, “[I]nfrastructural power is a two-way street: it also enables civil
society parties to control the state.” This interpretation of power means that
the “‘power’ of the modern state concerns not ‘state elites’ exercising power
over society but a tightening state-society relation, caging social relations over
national rather than local-regional or transnational terrain, thus politicizing . . .
far more of social life than had earlier states.”
 
24
 
The failure to build infrastructural power has been the central problem of
Burma under military rule. Creating a civil service that can provide public ser-
vices, an honest and reliable police force, and a judiciary that is trusted to de-
liver fair verdicts without political interference are all essential elements of
such a process. Achieving these goals would build the credibility of the state
apparatus, making it easier to induce citizens to cooperate voluntarily with the
government. Voluntary cooperation requires the government to yield some
measure of power to citizens, the civil service, and the judiciary, but it builds a
stronger, more reliable state apparatus. The successive military regimes that
have ruled Burma since 1962 have not been willing to part with even this
small measure of power. This is the primary reason why the military has been
able to rule for so long without serious challenges, but the cost has been a
 
24. Michael Mann, 
 
The Sources of Social Power, Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States,
1760–1914 
 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 59–61.
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dynamic in which the government can only deal with citizen resistance through
oppression. There are no licit means through which dialogue is possible, not
even within the newly revived National Convention, which is being run in a
highly authoritarian manner.
Far from resolving the problem of civilian administrative capacity, successive
military governments have continued to treat the civil service as an adversary,
repeatedly purging it and inserting military officers to oversee operations. This
policy has undermined morale in the civil service by blocking promotions. It
forces civil servants to find patrons in the military for advancement, rather
than relying on seniority or performance. Furthermore, the military government
pays public servants wages so low that they are forced to find sidelines or ex-
tort bribes. This puts the civil service into a predatory relationship with citi-
zens, making it difficult to build healthy relations with private individuals and
social groups. The result is that few cooperative relationships develop between
civil servants and citizens, thus reducing the potential for opposition to the re-
gime but also curbing the potential for the regime to develop infrastructural
power.
Ironically, from 1962–88 the military continued to attack the state apparatus
even while trying to organize an ambitious state-run economy under the Bur-
mese Socialist People’s Party (BSPP). Although the BSPP collapsed in 1988
and its successor, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) re-
pudiated socialism, much of the dynamic of state-society relations today has
its roots in the BSPP government.
Although the 1958–60 caretaker government had made modest improve-
ments in the efficiency and professionalism of the civil service, the BSPP gov-
ernment that took power in 1962 perpetuated and exacerbated the pattern of
political control over the civil service begun under the democratic government.
The BSPP government continued the practice of cronyism, now unchecked by
the presence of an opposition party. It also introduced a parallel administrative
system staffed by military officers, the Security and Development Committees
(SACs). Ancestors of today’s Peace and Development Councils (PDCs), these
parallel administrative structures effectively undermined the authority of the
line ministries in the capital to control staff and programs at the local level.
The military officers staffing the SACs then, and the PDCs today, had little
administrative or technical training. The result has been to disempower and
demoralize the civil service and judiciary.
In 1988, the military’s experiment with a state-run economy under the BSPP
collapsed. For years, Burma had in fact depended on an unregulated informal
sector,
 
25
 
 without which the economy would have ground to a halt. The BSPP
apparently did not understand the importance of the black market, because the
 
25. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “The Politics of State-Business Relations.”
This content downloaded from 129.1.59.69 on Thu, 30 Apr 2015 11:52:13 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 NEIL A. ENGLEHART
 
633
party attacked it in 1987 by demonetizing several denominations of bills. The
BSPP simply declared this currency worthless; because almost no one kept sav-
ings in the poorly regulated banks, many people lost their savings overnight.
Mass demonstrations ensued, ultimately bringing down the BSPP government.
Briefly the country seemed poised at what Aristide Zolberg calls a “moment
of madness,” when the rules appear to be up for grabs.
 
26
 
 Yet, the situation was
quite different from those breathless moments in Eastern Europe a year later
when the Warsaw Pact dictatorships began to collapse. In Eastern Europe, the
fall of the regime did not entail the collapse of public order. A relatively func-
tional, neutral state apparatus remained to provide policing and deliver basic
services, regardless of the ideological complexion of the regime. In Burma,
the situation was quite different. The BSPP had succeeded in destroying the
independent state apparatus, fusing the state and regime to such a degree that
when the regime fell there was nothing left outside of the military. The fall of
the BSPP revealed the true nature of the state-regime relationship: the only
element of the state that could survive on its own was the coercive apparatus.
The political crisis was compounded by the fact that no institutions existed
to mediate between the military and the demonstrators. There was no way for
the military to back down without endangering the physical safety of the se-
nior leadership. It is unlikely that anyone could have given credible guarantees
of personal safety to the generals and their families, in part because of the cor-
rupt and ineffective civil service, judiciary, and police forces that a transitional
government would have inherited.
By destroying the independent judiciary, the military regime had reduced
threats to its own power but also guaranteed that its officials could not be as-
sured of a fair trial, should the regime fail. In the absence of an independent
professional police force, their personal safety in custody could not be as-
sured. This element of fear on the part of the military leadership helps explain
why the military repeatedly enraged people further with their brutal repression
of the demonstrators: they were terrified of losing control and had no way to
negotiate a compromise. The lynching of suspected intelligence service offic-
ers and informers during the 1988 demonstrations was a small taste of what
could be expected if the regime collapsed completely.
The demonstrations and their bloody suppression thus showed that the mili-
tary had no way to engage hostile elements in society except through coercion.
Regime officials had destroyed the competence and independence of the po-
lice, judiciary, and civil service in order to consolidate their own hold on
power. Lacking these alternative institutional linkages to society—not to men-
tion political parties or interest groups—they had only one means to prevent
 
26. Aristide Zolberg, “Moments of Madness,” 
 
Politics and Society 
 
2:2 (Winter 1971), pp. 183–
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what they saw as the impending collapse of social order: violence. Violence
proved to be insufficient in the short run, as they began to lose control of the
country.
In the wake of these events, policing began to break down and looting
spread. Local authorities such as monks, influential people, police, and army
officers began to organize local administrations on an ad hoc basis to cope
with the growing chaos. More ominously for the military, crowds on several
occasions lynched known or suspected officers and informers from the intelli-
gence apparatus.
 
27
 
 Although some opposition leaders tried to prevent some of
the lynchings and looting, they were not very successful. Increased government
repression also did not initially deter the demonstrators, and even seemed to
inflame them. In some cases, the demonstrators responded with attacks on troops
using improvised weapons such as 
 
jinglees 
 
(darts made from sharpened bi-
cycle or umbrella spokes, often dipped in poison, and fired from slingshots).
 
28
 
The demonstrations ended only after a group of military officers calling
themselves the SLORC constituted itself as an interim authority. SLORC troops
unleashed even greater violence but were deployed more systematically. They
moved against the leaders of the opposition first and then dealt with the less-
organized looters.
 
29
 
Using the army chain of command, SLORC reorganized the administrative
system in a relatively short time. Regional commanders were ordered to form
state and division-level Law and Order Restoration Councils (LORCs), and
local commanders to form township and village LORCs. These served much
the same administrative functions that the earlier SACs had. SLORC also prom-
ised to hold multi-party elections, which were scheduled for 1990. At the same
time, it began a program to significantly expand the army and improve its
weapons systems. The elections were held on schedule, with results that sur-
prised the military: their favored party lost. The NLD under Aung San Suu Kyi
won a landslide victory, magnified by the disproportionality of the single mem-
ber plurality district voting rules. The SLORC refused to recognize these re-
sults and retained power with neither a constitution nor an electoral mandate.
The SLORC then began negotiating a series of ceasefires with ethnic insur-
gent groups, substantially reducing the internal armed threats that it faced. In
1997, apparently feeling that its task had shifted from restoring law and order
to fostering peace and development, the junta reorganized and renamed itself
the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The name of the territorial
 
27. See Bertil Lintner, 
 
Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy 
 
(Bangkok: White Lotus,
1990), pp. 121–22.
28. Ibid., pp. 74–75.
29. For contrasting views of these events, see ibid.; and also Maung Maung, 
 
The 1988 Uprising
in Burma
 
 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Southeast Asia Center, 1999).
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administrative units was changed from Law and Order Restoration Councils to
Peace and Development Councils (PDCs), although this entailed no changes
of organization, mandate, or personnel.
 
The Continuing Problems of Decentralization and 
Administrative Capacity
 
Although the PDCs give the impression of having considerable administrative
capacity by employing the army chain of command as scaffolding for territo-
rial administration, severe institutional problems continue to plague the Bur-
mese state apparatus today. These problems are not likely to be resolved by
the introduction of democracy and may well undermine the possibility of a
transition. They fall into two broad categories: lack of administrative capacity
and decentralization of authority.
The lack of state capacity results from the long-term policy of undermining
the civil service and seeking to replace key officials with military officers. Re-
peated purges of the civil service have occurred, most recently following the
1988 uprising. Loyalty and patronage remain major factors in appointment
and promotion, reducing the overall educational level and technical compe-
tence of the bureaucracy. Military officers are still placed in senior positions,
blocking promotion based on merit or seniority. This alters the merit incen-
tives for civil servants, so that even those with technical competence have little
reason to use it. Instead, they spend time and resources on securing patronage
from the more powerful. As under the BSPP, civil servants live by the code of
the “three don’ts”: don’t work, don’t get involved, and don’t get fired.
 
30
 
 In
Weberian terms, the civil service resembles a patrimonial rather than rational
bureaucracy.
Furthermore, it is increasingly a prebendal bureaucracy.
 
31
 
 As Figure 1 shows,
the real wages of civil servants declined by half between 1989 and 1995. Years
of cripplingly low wages in a highly inflationary environment have forced
civil servants to supplement their income in unorthodox or unethical ways.
 
32
 
30. Compare Maung Maung Gyi, 
 
Burmese Political Values: The Socio-Political Roots of Au-
thoritarianism 
 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 194, and Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “The Politics
of State-Business Relations,” p. 180.
31. Meaning that they lived off fees paid for services, rather than a salary. Such systems limit
the control superiors have over the hierarchy of officials below them and are notorious for breeding
corruption.
32. Civil servants formerly received a ration of food and other supplies at a reduced price, a
practice that was recently discontinued in lieu of a salary supplement. The fixed-price goods were,
of course, resistant to inflation, while the salary supplements will not be unless they are continually
increased. On civil service wages and corruption, see Aung San Suu Kyi, 
 
Letters from Burma
 
 (New
York: Penguin, 1996), pp. 171–77; David Steinberg, 
 
Burma: The State of Myanmar (Washington,
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), pp. 53, 132–38, 157; Burma Issues, “In Rangoon: Civil
Servants and Cemeteries,” Burma Issues (Bangkok) 9:2 (February 1999), p. 3.
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figure 1 Burmese Public Sector Wages, 1989–1995 (Average Wage in Kyat 
Per Month, Constant 1985–86 Values)
SOURCE: World Bank, Myanmar: Policies for Sustaining Economic Reform, October 1995.
figure 2 Burmese Tax Collections/GDP 1989–2000 (In Millions of Kyat, 
Constant 1985–86 Values)
SOURCE: Ibid. to Figure 1.
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The result is that the civil service has become increasingly corrupt, while its
competence and professionalism have declined. The lack of administrative ca-
pacity is beginning to undermine all sectors of the state apparatus, impeding
even the core function of resource extraction. Figure 2 shows tax revenue ad-
justed for inflation between 1990 and 2000. The data were gathered by the
World Bank and are considerably more reliable than the government’s own of-
ficial figures. It demonstrates a steady fall in the state’s capacity to tax. Even
the World Bank, which normally favors low marginal tax rates, has expressed
alarm at the low level of collections in Myanmar.33 Reduced revenue has radi-
cally curtailed public services. Services that are theoretically supplied by the
state, such as education and health care, are privatized in practice, as the civil
servants who supply them demand bribes to perform their duties.
The incapacity of the state to collect taxes and manage its budget has pro-
duced one of the most serious forms of human rights abuse in Burma: the use
of forced labor. An International Labor Organization (ILO) investigation of
this issue revealed that prior to 1999, there was no provision in the govern-
ment’s budget for unskilled labor for public works.34 The government simply
assumed that local military commanders would conscript the labor they needed.
In contrast to the civil service, the government has lavished resources on the
armed forces, the Tatmadaw. In recent years, the military has grown enor-
mously; officers receive numerous privileges including subsidized food, hous-
ing, health care, and education. These privileges provide a lifeline for many
families struggling to make ends meet. According to Callahan, “[I]t is difficult
to find a family in central Burma today that does not rely on some member,
distant or intermediate, whose service in the armed forces provides the family
with access to higher-quality rice, cheaper cooking oil and other necessities.”35
The army also remains the only avenue for social advancement open to most
young men.
The military has been relatively insulated from declining revenue collec-
tion because it receives priority in funding. However, declining revenues and
33. World Bank, “Myanmar: Policies for Sustaining Economic Reform,” Washington, D.C.,
October 16, 1995, ,http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont5details&eid5
000009265_3961019103423.. The more telling statistic would be tax collections as a proportion
of gross domestic product (GDP), but the lack of good estimates of GDP for Myanmar (in part be-
cause of the very large black market and the government’s inability to collect economic data)
makes this calculation impossible.
34. International Labor Office Governing Body, “Developments Concerning the Question of
the Observance by the Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29),”
G.B. 282/4, Geneva, November 2001, p. 16.
35. Mary P. Callahan, “Cracks in the Edifice,” in Burma/Myanmar: Strong State, Weak Re-
gime, eds. Morten B. Pedersen, Emily Rudland, and Ronald J. May (Bathurst, New South Wales,
Australia: Crawford House, 2000), pp. 31–32. See also Moe Gyo, “Fatal Attraction,” The Irra-
waddy Online Edition, March 2000, ,http://www.irrawaddy.org..
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chronic corruption have begun to make it difficult to supply the expanding
army. Some units are now required to find their own food, suggesting that seri-
ous supply problems have emerged. This practice has led to increasing abuses
by soldiers: some units have expropriated land to grow food. A number of the
child soldiers interviewed by Human Rights Watch for their 2002 report on
Burma reported being forced to grow food on army farms.36 Other units
simply commandeer supplies from villagers. The Bangkok-based opposition
group Burma Issues documented 26 such incidents in a single village between
October 12, 1998, and February 15, 1999. Losses totaled 79,870 kyat (roughly
US$120) in cash, five baskets of rice (approximately 230 pounds), 47 chickens,
and one cat.37
Authority has been decentralized to regional military commands in practice
since 1988. The military has become the core institution of the state, but sub-
stantial authority is devolved to local and regional commanders. The PDC
hierarchy that provides for territorial administration is dominated by the mili-
tary, meaning that virtually all administrative functions are exercised through
officers. Typically, the division PDC is chaired by the regional military com-
mander and the district PDC by a lieutenant colonel. Only at the village level
are civilians in charge.
The linear chain of command does not mean that the administration is highly
centralized, however. Lacking the technical expertise and human resources
necessary to create the centralized state that would clearly have been their first
preference, the SLORC and SPDC have been forced to devolve power to local
military commanders, producing an inconsistent, ad hoc form of administra-
tion. Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung points out that in contrast to the centrally
controlled BSPP administration, the PDC system is “prefectural.”38 Harking
back to the British tradition of the generalist district officer, state and division
PDCs directly control all officials in their area of jurisdiction. Central minis-
tries and departments need the clearance of the state/divisional PDC to imple-
ment policy locally, giving the PDC chairs tremendous executive power. Lack
of effective oversight promotes corruption and creates incentives for local offi-
cials and regional commanders to make arrangements at variance with central
government policy, often to accommodate individuals with the resources
to pay regular bribes. The central government retains the ultimate authority to
36. Human Rights Watch, “My Gun Was as Tall as Me”: Child Soldiers in Burma (New York:
Human Rights Watch, 2002), pp. 38, 51–52, 62–63, and 73–76. In some cases, soldiers reportedly
serve as unpaid factory labor as well.
37. Saw Kwekloh, “Kyuakkyi Township: Mountains and Plains Apart,” Burma Issues 9:9
(September 1999), p. 3.
38. Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, “Paddy Farmers and the State: Agricultural Policies and
Legitimacy in Rural Myanmar,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison (2001),
p. 165.
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remove regional military commanders through the military chain of command.
This was demonstrated in 1997, when a number were brought back to Rangoon.
However, removing regional commanders is costly because whatever control
the central government has over local affairs is exercised through them. Re-
moving them breaks up the informal accommodations and understandings the
commanders have negotiated to make their regions run more smoothly. Those
understandings now constitute the regime’s only point of access into society,
short of outright coercion. The central government therefore grants local and
regional commanders a great deal of latitude, even tolerating outright defiance
in some cases.
One retired civil servant recalls being told by a regional commander to “for-
get about the instructions of your ministries. I am the minister of ministers.
You do what I order you to do.”39 Ordinary citizens recognize the reality of de-
centralization as well. One farmer, commenting on land confiscations by the
military, remarks, “Nowadays, you do not have to be afraid of people from
above, but you definitely have to be afraid of people from below.”40 A telling
symptom of this decentralization is the creation of numerous military road-
blocks and checkpoints at which informal internal tariffs are levied—including
on rice destined for government depots.41
An important counterweight to this decentralization until recently was the
Military Intelligence Service (MI) under General Khin Nyunt. The MI’s inter-
nal security functions extended to the military; it boasted the most centralized
and effective bureaucratic structure in the country. It operated entirely outside
the influence of the regional military commanders and was useful to the SPDC
for keeping tabs on them. Khin Nyunt’s fall from grace in October 2004 and
the subsequent purge of MI, which has extended quite far down the chain of
command, significantly reduced the level of oversight over the regional com-
manders. Whether the new internal security apparatus that emerges from the
purge will be able to build a similarly independent and centralized bureau-
cratic structure remains to be seen. In the short run, at least, these events have
contributed to the country’s centrifugal tendencies.
Any transitional government that emerged would have to deal with the prob-
lem of administrative capacity. It would have to substantially strengthen the
crippled civil service to create a bureaucratic counterweight to the military,
somehow locating and training thousands of qualified personnel. It would also
have to either cooperate extensively with the military in territorial administra-
tion or suffer a reduced capacity to make policy effective on the ground. It
would have to rely on the military to preserve centralized control of violence
39. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “The Politics of State-Business Relations,” pp. 252–53.
40. Thawnghmung, “Paddy Farmers and the State,” pp. 263–64.
41. Ibid., p. 319.
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or risk slipping back into the quagmire of pocket armies and insurgency that
undermined the democratic regime of the 1950s.
Under these conditions, any democratic government that came to power in
the sudden and complete way U.S. policy appears to envision would suffer
many of the same problems as the AFPFL did in the 1950s. It would lack an
effective civil service and a territorial administration that could govern the
country without extensive participation by the military. The bureaucrats it
would have to work with would be considered suspect because of their com-
plicity with the military government and their reputation for corruption. It
would be forced to rely on substantially independent local bosses, many of
whose power derives from connections with military officers forged under
military rule. This would handicap the central government because of the diffi-
culty of getting these local authorities to surrender the resources necessary to
centralize power. Ethnic insurgents would be strongly tempted to take advan-
tage of the central government’s weakness to press their own demands for au-
tonomy or independence, demands that are anathema to the majority of the
Burman population. The situation would be ripe for a return to military rule,
recalling 1958 and 1962. The collapse of democracy in the 1950s stemmed
largely from lack of state capacity, and current conditions are not promising
for a future democratic regime, for similar reasons.
For all the above reasons, the military will necessarily be a part of any fu-
ture transition. The question, therefore, is not how to get the military to turn
over power, as U.S. policymakers seem to envision. Instead, it is how to en-
courage officers to cooperate in a transitional process over the long run. This
requires efforts not simply to pressure the regime but also to transform the po-
litical environment so that cooperation with a more representative civilian
government will appear attractive to the military.
Alternative Strategies
Most strategies for advancing the cause of democracy in Burma today do not
look very far past a change of leadership. By applying isolation and sanction,
these strategies aim to pressure the current government to step down.42 The in-
fluential Aung San Suu Kyi advocates this approach, which has also been ac-
cepted by the U.S. government and the European Union (EU). However, if it is
true that the military will have to be induced to cooperate extensively with any
transitional regime, then sanctions and isolation appear to be ineffective ways
of promoting change—and new possibilities emerge.
42. A more democratic government, if it were to come to power, would certainly receive for-
eign assistance. However, under current conditions the country’s capacity to absorb aid usefully
would be limited, and it is a virtual certainty that massive corruption in its disbursement would
result.
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Although sanctions have clearly hurt the economy and increased suffering
among ordinary Burmese, their political impact has been negligible.43 Firms
from Singapore and China are happy to fill the investment gap, but they are
unlikely to advance democratic ideals. The economy has suffered much more
from the indigenous banking crisis of early 2003, which caused the kyat to
sink rapidly against the dollar. However, it then recovered to nearly its pre-crisis
level, a recovery unimpeded by the intensification of U.S. sanctions following
Aung San Suu Kyi’s rearrest in May that year.
Indeed, sanctions and isolation may have strengthened the regime by limit-
ing its contact with the democratic world. There is no small irony in the fact
that the BSPP employed a policy of isolation to secure its power, while the
SPDC has had isolation imposed on it from the outside. This isolation argu-
ably makes it easier for the SPDC to maintain tight control over the political
opposition.
Sanctions have further weakened state capacity, encouraging some military
officers to engage in illicit drug smuggling and natural resource extraction to
generate foreign exchange. Sanctions thereby have contributed to the spread
of official corruption and undermined the rule of law. If anything, they have
reduced the probability of a democratic transition by encouraging illicit preda-
tory behavior by local and regional military commanders. In addition, they have
deprived civil servants of contact with their peers in other countries, so that
they have not been socialized into international standards of conduct, ethical
codes, and best practices.
If the state apparatus needs significant rehabilitation to make democratic
governance possible, a very different policy is entailed. Engaging the current
government will be necessary in order to reduce financial incentives for official
criminality and corruption and to provide assistance in building bureaucratic
capacity and training civil servants in international norms. Such engagement
may be distasteful because of the record of the current government, but to
avoid it on those grounds ignores the fact that the military will have to be a
part of any democratic transition.
Relaxing sanctions on trade and investment is likely to help. When the U.S.
and the EU prevent their nationals from creating business relationships in
43. See Leon T. Hadar, “U.S. Sanctions against Burma: A Failure on All Fronts,” Cato Institute
Trade Policy Analysis, no. 1, March 26, 1998, ,http://www.cato.org/pubs/trade/tpa-001.html.;
“An Interview with David Steinberg,” The Irrawaddy Online Edition, May 2003, ,http://www.
irrawaddy.org.; and most recently, Morten Pedersen and Robert H. Taylor, An Independent Report
for the European Commission: Supporting Burma/Myanmar’s National Reconciliation Process:
Challenges and Opportunities, Brussels, January 2005, at ,http://www.burma.no/publikasjoner/
050405_BurmaDayreport.htm.. Burmese and foreign observers unanimously expressed skepti-
cism about the effects of the tightened sanctions to the author when he was in Yangon in December
2003 and January 2005.
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Burma, they do not so much punish the regime as make themselves irrelevant.
Chinese and Singapore firms are able to supply foreign-manufactured goods
and investment. This means that the predominant foreign influences in Burma
come from undemocratic countries. Relaxing sanctions and permitting invest-
ment could balance this situation and put many more Burmese citizens in con-
tact with the democratic world. Furthermore, investment would increase the
level of diplomatic contact with Burma and increase the leverage of the U.S.
and the EU. Greater Burmese participation in multilateral forums would have
a similar effect. In addition, the demands and expectations of Western inves-
tors would likely stimulate greater interest in, knowledge of, and respect for
international norms and the rule of law on the part of the government.
However, greater economic engagement alone is unlikely to have a signifi-
cant impact on the political situation. Engagement would help relieve the suf-
fering of many ordinary Burmese and might help stimulate a demand for more
competent economic policymaking. A policy of engagement, however, must
also include programs expressly designed to build bureaucratic capacity and
educate civil servants about international norms.
Because activists sharply criticize any form of engagement with the SPDC,
there are currently few capacity-building programs.44 At an official level, only
the Australian government has recently engaged with Myanmar on issues of
governance.45 In 1998, the Australians suggested to the SPDC that it create an
independent human rights commission and sponsored a series of workshops at-
tended by over 200 mid-level government officials from various ministries and
the police.46 The Australians argue that the program was successful in part be-
cause of its limited, long-term goals. They did not seek immediate change but
rather sought to build the basis for more gradual improvements. Organizers as-
sert that the program was groundbreaking in initiating cooperative government-
to-government contact on human rights issues that led the government of
Myanmar to acknowledge to its own employees its existing obligations under
international human rights law. In addition, Australia’s former ambassador to
Myanmar has claimed that there were subsequent improvements in the areas
44. For a rare argument that there should be more capacity-building programs, see In-
ternational Crisis Group, “Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement, or Another Way Forward?”
Bangkok/Brussels, Asia Report, no. 78, April 26, 2004, ,http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/0/
5b5afc8797ee9daf85256e820065330e?OpenDocument..
45. There have been some relatively low-profile private initiatives as well. For instance, the
Sasakawa Peace Foundation, a Japanese non-governmental organization, has sponsored a series of
workshops on enhancing civil service capacity. See “Workshop on Capacity Enhancement of
Myanmar Civil Service Continues,” in the official online newspaper The New Light of Myanmar,
November 22, 2002, ,http://www.Myanmar.com/nlm/enlm/Nov22_region6.html..
46. See the Burma country brief at ,http://www.ausaid.gov.au.. The Australian govern-
ment has also sponsored leadership and community management training for refugees living in
Thailand.
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of prison reform, child protection, and forced labor.47 The program, terminated
after the rearrest of Aung San Suu Kyi in May 2003, nonetheless provides
some evidence that limited exchanges with moderate long-term goals can help
make at least marginal improvements.
Human rights groups and democracy activists have criticized the Australian
program on two points. One is that it has not demonstrated results. On this
count, it must be said that no strategy advanced by the critics, including isola-
tion and sanctions, has passed this test either. The second point is that the
mid-level officials who participated were not appropriate targets for such a pro-
gram because they do not make policy. Yet, it should be noted that these offi-
cials would be crucial for making democratic governance work in the event of
a transition.48
Expanding educational opportunities overseas for Burmese citizens would
also help, creating a body of well-educated people exposed to the West and
democratic politics. The pool of Western-educated Burmese is relatively small
and rapidly aging. To make democracy work, it will be critical to have a pool
of people with international experience and appropriate skills available for re-
cruitment into government service in the event of a transition. The expansion
of scholarship opportunities and study trips to both private citizens and gov-
ernment officials would serve this end. The placement of Myanmar government
officials as visiting interns in international agencies and Western governments
would help to build knowledge of international norms among the very people
whose active support a fledgling democratic regime would most need.
Constructive engagement policies thus far have not been more effective than
sanctions at changing the political situation in Burma. For instance, advocates
of admitting Burma to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have been
frustrated in their hope that this would encourage political moderation, and
now face the embarrassing possibility that the most repressive country in the
region will assume the chair of ASEAN in 2006. Official development aid from
Japan and Germany and loans from international financial institutions prior to
1988 did not do much to promote political change either; these economic effects
were blunted by the poor policies of the BSPP.
Burmese politics has been, and remains, largely driven by domestic dynamics.
Outsiders need to realistically assess the possibility that nothing they can do
will induce change, especially in the short term. What they can do, however, is
47. Trevor Wilson, “Australia’s Human Rights Initiative, 2002–2003: A Brief Case Study,”
presentation to EU “Burma Day,” Brussels, April 5, 2005, ,http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/
Burma_Day-Trevor_Wilson.htm..
48. On criticisms of the program, see “Burma/Australia: Doubts Raised over Policy,” The Irra-
waddy Online Edition, October 10, 2002, ,http://www.irrawaddy.org.; and Bob Burton, “Aus-
tralia Dances with the Burmese Military,” Asia Times online, May 2, 2003, ,http://www.atimes.com..
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adopt more modest goals to encourage the development of institutions that
will help create new possibilities for change, make liberalization more realis-
tic, and increase the probability that a transition will be sustainable when it
comes.
Shortly before his death in Vancouver in 2004, the Shan minority democ-
racy activist Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe urged that the dialogue in Burma be
shifted from “hot issues” such as democracy and regime change to “hard is-
sues,” including the restoration of health and educational services, economic
reform, and normalizing life in regions of conflict. The problem, he noted, is
that “there is a wide gulf between the state and society in Burma, and the pro-
longed dysfunctional state-society relation has made it difficult to bridge the
gap, and even more difficult for the actors and protagonists to undertake any
constructive approach. Each side is locked into rigid positions that discourage
any fresh initiatives and fresh approaches.”49
Programs to build state capacity can help break down these rigidities and
create new possibilities by restoring some normalcy to the relations between
state and society. They can contribute to building a civil service separate from
the military and they can provide opportunities for a peaceful transition by
helping to moderate the government’s adversarial relationship with much of
society. Such programs may build legitimacy and support for the current gov-
ernment, but they will also help foster institutions that can ultimately make
more democratic governance feasible.
If state capacity is important to creating the conditions for stable democrati-
zation, then it is short-sighted for activists to criticize such programs. Capacity-
building programs should become an important part of a process of engage-
ment with the Burmese government. A transition will be feasible only when
the state apparatus has sufficient capacity and independence from the military
to serve a democratic government.
From the perspective of foreigners concerned about political progress in
Burma/Myanmar, the alternatives are not tolerating a repressive military gov-
ernment or using sanctions to create a democratic utopia under the NLD. The
choice is rather between a moderate policy designed to facilitate an environ-
ment in which a peaceful transition might be possible and a policy of imposed
isolation and sanctions designed to bring about a catastrophic collapse of the
current system. The latter, however, is hardly likely to trigger a democratic tran-
sition worthy of the name; it is more likely to create a chaotic competition for
power among army units, insurgents, the NLD, drug smugglers, and others, a
competition that could well lead to a complete collapse of civil administration
and law enforcement where the state is already fragile.
49. Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe, “Changing Regime: Rangoon, after Baghdad?” April 23, 2003,
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